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One of the expected benefits from deregulation of a previously regulated industry is a movement 
to a more rational cost and production structure in line with market conditions.  As part of this 
transition for the railroad industry, it would be expected that with the removal of most regulation of 
transportation rates, railroads would be forced to undertake changes in the way their services were 
provided to the shippers.  A large portion of this change would be expected to come in the form of 
modification and rationalization of the capital plant as the firms moved to a new, more efficient cost 
structure.  This paper involves the estimation of investment and capital degradation functions for 
the U.S. rail industry to evaluate the changes that have occurred in these two critical areas of capital 
stock analysis.
Over the last three decades, a number of papers have examined the transportation industry’s 
cost and/or production functions, both prior to and following deregulation.  Most of this work has 
involved the use of proxy variables for the level of capital stock.  The most common proxy variable 
is the miles-of-road operated. While use of miles-of-road has been commonly acknowledged as an 
inaccurate indication of the actual level and quality of the capital stock, it has been generally used 
as the best available measure.  Unfortunately this “size” factor alone is unable to accurately reflect 
the nature of rail capital as a multidimensional entity.  The availability of a data series on overall rail 
capital stocks, or, more desirably, series broken into roadway and equipment capital stocks, would 
greatly improve the ability to accurately estimate railroad transportation costs for both regulatory 
and economic analytical purposes.  
Research into the nature of rail costs and production has included work by Caves, Christensen, 
and Swanson (1980, 1981a, 1981b, 1981c); Spady and Friedlaender (1976); Bereskin (1989, 1996); 
Barbera, Grimm, Phillips, and Selzer (1987); and Lee and Baumel (1987).  Each of these papers has 
applied the translog function to a cost model to obtain estimates of the structure of railroad costs. 
Of primary interest in these models was the underlying response to short-run changes in output level 
and the effects this would have on the level of cost. Barbera, Grimm, Phillips, and Selzer (1987) 
and Lee and Baumel (1987), as an example, are both primarily aimed toward measuring economies 
of scale and density in the industry rather than in examining the dynamic question of long-run 
costs and changes in capital structure.  These studies involve the development of a generalized cost 
function with the primary emphasis on developing a short-run as opposed to a long-run cost model. 
While both studies estimate an underlying cost structure using the translog functional form, the 
methodological emphasis differs between the two.
Railroad Capital Stock Changes in the Post-
Deregulation Period
Railroad Capital Stock Changes

The Barbera, Grimm, Phillips, and Selzer study (1987) is primarily concerned with directly 
estimating the cost relation to test hypotheses concerning economies of scale and density in the 
industry and thus estimates only the cost function.  Alternatively, Lee and Baumel (1987) deals 
with a simultaneous estimation of both the cost and demand function for rail services for the years 
1983 and 1984, where the translog function is used as a Taylor series approximation to an unknown 
underlying cost function while the demand function, being a derived relationship, is modeled as a 
Cobb-Douglas structure.  Both studies find that economies of density exist although the estimates 
obtained by Lee and Baumel (1987) are significantly lower than for Barbera, Grimm, Phillips, and 
Selzer (1987) while both agree that returns to scale appear to be insignificant.  Again, however, 
the proxy variable used for the size of capital stock in each of these studies is miles-of-road, an 
approximation that may introduce a bias into the results as miles-of-road fails to address the condition 
and level of quality of the roadway capital.  One interesting conclusion of all these works is that 
there appears, at least in the earlier pre-deregulation analysis, to be a fairly large amount of excess 
capital stock.  Estimates range from capacity utilization levels at 30-35% (Friedlaender 1971) to the 
existence of up to 200,000 miles of excess trackage (Keeler 1974).  The implication of these studies 
is that when given the chance, under deregulation the industry is likely to reduce the number of 
miles of road, reduce the level of capital stocks, or find a way to use capital more efficiently.
Friedlaender et al. (1993) have estimated a model of railroad costs where the capital structure 
has been specified using an inventory theoretic approach.  Using a modified network approach 
and looking at several service categories as defining the output level, they are able to estimate the 
appropriate level of capital necessary to efficiently operate given the desired output level.  Their 
findings indicate that the railroad industry is over-capitalized and should optimally be reducing the 
level of capital stock.  There are two possible flaws with this study as it compares to the current 
situation in the rail industry.  First, a large portion of their data on railroad investment, and as such 
capital, was from the pre-deregulation period when railroads were greatly restricted in their ability to 
rationalize their capital plant.  Second, by the early 1990’s, there were indications from the industry 
that for certain traffic types (particularly double stack and other intermodal trains) the industry was 
approaching some restrictions on capacity.  This latter result may not be completely inconsistent 
with the Friedlaender results as it would be expected that, when given a chance to rationalize their 
plant, the railroads would attempt to develop more efficient use of their available capital by investing 
in plant and equipment that was more appropriate to market demands, and then later reducing the 
excess levels toward the more appropriate total stocks as suggested by this research.
In an effort to determine the effects of density and railroad mergers on costs, Ivaldi and 
McCullough (2001) estimated a translog model of short-run railroad costs using different types of 
car-miles as a measure of traffic.  Miles-of-road is used as a proxy for fixed capital stock although 
this is modified by using the number of ties replaced in each year as a proxy for investment in 
roadway structure.  Alternatively, Bitzen and Keeler (2003) have, in an effort to explain productivity 
growth in the deregulated industry, applied both miles-of-road and developed price indices for right-
of-way capital structure and for equipment capital to explain the effects of capital within railroad 
costs.  Neither of these studies directly develops an estimate of what the capital stock may have 
looked like during the studied period.
One of the primary concerns of deregulation was to create the ability on the part of the industry 
to operate more efficiently and gain increased traffic (as well as greater flexibility in the area of 
abandonment and sale of unprofitable lines).  Therefore, it would be expected that during the first 
several years following deregulation the railroads would be in a process of both improving the 
quality of the capital stock and reducing the excess capacity.  Excess capacity may however be 
reduced in two opposed manners.  First, the capital may be sold off or depreciated so that an actual 
reduction takes place.  Second, if pricing flexibility, changes in work rules, and more demand-
related marketing is able to increase the total level of traffic on a given railroad, the “excess” portion 
of capacity will be reduced through gains in traffic.  It is possible that in the post-deregulation period 
both of these factors were important in the railroad industry. 
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DEVELOPING A MODEL OF RAIL CAPITAL
The methodology applied here is an inventory model of capital accumulation based on degradation 
of capital through usage and replacement (and upgrading) through investment.  Under this model, 
the level of capital available at any period is indicated as:
(1) Kt = Kt-1 + It - DKt 
where Kt is the capital stock at time t , Kt-1 is the capital stock at time t-1, It is a measure of the 
investment occurring during the tth period and DKt  is some proportionality measure associated with 
degradation of the existing capital stock.1
Several problems exist with the use of the above relationship in determining the level of the 
capital stock.  First, the rate of degradation is not constant over time and is related to the level of 
activity on the part of the firm because capital is a factor of production and is degraded during the 
production process.  Second, degradation of the capital stock, as opposed to accounting depreciation 
is generally not directly observable.  Finally, the initial level of capital at t=0 (other than at the initial 
start up point for the firm) may not be observable either.  For most capital estimation analysis, this 
latter problem is finessed through the use of the assumption that if observations are available for 
enough of the lifetime of the firm, eventually the initial capital stock will have been completely 
depreciated and therefore become insignificant.  Over a very long period, this assumption on the 
degradation of the initial physical capital stock may be realistic as the model will be expected 
to eventually converge to a reasonable estimate of the capital stock.  In the rail industry, where 
some physical capital is expected to have a life of several decades, the assumption of the initial 
capital stock being rapidly depreciated to zero may be heroic at best.  Even considering the possible 
shortfalls, this model has nonetheless been used in a number of capital estimation cases with varying 
degrees of success.
Following from equation (1), and using financial data it is possible to estimate the level of 
investment in a given year.  This may then be adjusted by a price index to obtain an estimate of the 
level of real investment where Pt is a proxy measure of the purchase price of new capital goods.
2
(2) Ikt = It / Pt  
The level of a firm’s degradation at any time t is somewhat harder to evaluate.  For purposes of 
this analysis, the level of degradation will be proxied by the depreciation values stated at the level 
of 1983 dollars.
(3) Dkt = Dt / Pt  
Because depreciation levels are constant once the asset is put into place, the values of depreciation 
always refer back to the dollar value of the capital goods in the year they were put into place. 
This methodology necessarily creates a problem in estimating degradation in that depreciation is an 
accounting measure.  The depreciation rates as set therefore do not directly relate to the intensity of 
usage of the asset and the reduction in remaining life.  However, there is no accounting way that the 
real degradation can be measured directly.  As a result, constant dollar depreciation is used within 
an errors-in-variables estimation resulting in the closest approximation of the actual degradation 
value.
Historic levels of investment and assets, used to create the starting level of capital stock, may 
be obtained or estimated from the firm’s financial reports.  The price values are determined from 
price index publications.  It is then necessary to obtain an estimate of the level of capital degradation 
which may then be related to specific activities of the firm.  Values developed are then introduced 
into equation (1) to develop reasonable estimates of capital relative to the initial starting value at 
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The long history of railroad regulation has provided an unusually valuable data source.  Each 
railroad has been required to provide appropriate accounting information, previously to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) and currently to the Surface Transportation Board (STB), on a timely 
basis.  This information has been collected and compiled by the Association of American Railroads 
(AAR) and is available through their publication Analysis	of	Class	I	Railroads.  When combined 
with the input price and shipper and other car data published by the AAR in AAR	Railroad	Cost	
Indexes, and Railroad	Facts, and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics producer price indices, a fairly 
complete picture of rail operations may be developed.  While the price indices may not correspond 
exactly to individual input prices, the several index classifications do allow each index to represent 
an overall class of input types.  Of particular interest was the price index for materials and supplies, 
which was used in approximating the level of real (1983 dollar) roadway investment and to restate 
the level of degradation to constant 1983 dollar values.  The wholesale price index, as developed 
by the Bureau of Labor for Railway Equipment (WPU 144), was used to deflate the values of 
railway equipment investment and to restate the level to a constant 1983 dollar value.  All variables 
were evaluated, when possible, in terms of their AAR classification as eastern or western railroad 
companies. Operating statistics were obtained from the Analysis	of	Class	I	Railroads, the same AAR 
source as for the asset, investment, and depreciation values.
The data was developed for the years 1983 to 2005, inclusive.  This period was chosen as being 
the longest over which consistent data was available.  Prior to 1978, the ICC required a different 
set of accounts, making data from these earlier periods inconsistent with the more recent data. 
Likewise, the reporting of the data was modified following 1979 causing potential inconsistencies 
between 1978-1979 and the following years.  In addition, the accounting system was changed from 
retirement, replacement, betterment accounting to depreciation accounting starting with 1983.  It 
was decided that even though the period from 1978 through 1982 may have been desirable, that the 
years 1983-2005 were the only period over which the accounting data was continuously consistent 
as the rail accounting system underwent changes in both 1978-1979 and 1983.  The levels of railway 
assets are reported at year-end levels so that these values were used as a starting place.  Investment 
and degradation equations were developed for the years 1984 through 2005, which could then be 
used with the 1983 year-end value to develop the estimates of capital stocks that would have been 
reported at the end of each subsequent year
The estimation period involves a time over which a number of mergers occurred.  As the 
data used was a paneled data set, estimation involved the use of dummy variables to indicate each 
firm.  Thus it was necessary to determine an appropriate convention both for defining the firms 
and adapting their data to the analytical needs.  The decision was made to follow the reporting of 
the AAR railroad names as indicative of the management structure.  One significant modification 
to the database was necessary with respect to the mergers.  As a merger occurs, the previous data 
series ends and one (or more) of the old entities is folded into the new (or existing) firm.  For 
example, when the Union Pacific, Missouri Pacific, and Western Pacific were effectively combined 
for reporting purposes, the Missouri Pacific and Western Pacific ceased to exist as separate entities 
while the Union Pacific grew substantially.  Likewise when the Norfolk & Western and Southern 
Railway systems merged, both entities ceased to exist and the Norfolk Southern was listed as the 
consolidated firm.  In each of these cases it was necessary to modify the data series to minimize the 
effects of these discontinuities wherever lagged variables were used.  The convention that was used 
was to create a new firm dummy variable to account for the newly defined firm and to additionally 
sum the values of the merger partners in the year prior to the joint reporting and to consider this as 
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the equivalent period earlier firm, as if in the merger process, capital assets had been transferred 
directly between the firms where lagged variable values were needed.
The data set as thus constituted consists of 22 years of observations with 28 firms before 
consolidation.  After consolidation and removal of several firms from the list of Class I railroads 
due to reduction in comparative revenues, the final year (2005) consisted of data for only seven 
firms.  Likewise, because the estimation of investment levels involved the use of lagged variables, 
the data set for actual estimation was reduced by one year.  Additionally, several data points were 
eliminated due to reporting anomalies such as in the year 1999, when Conrail reported a part of 
the year separately and the rest of the year was combined into the CSX and Norfolk Southern data. 
Constructing the data in this manner gave 267 observations for a varying number of firms per year 
for the 22 years, a large enough sample to provide sufficient degrees of freedom for most estimation 
techniques associated with pooled data.  The variables used in the model are detailed in Table 1.
Table 1: Definition of Variables
D_RD_83  Roadway degradation (constant 1983 dollars) (proxied by roadway depreciation  / P_MS)
D_EQ_83  Equipment degradation (constant 1983 dollars) (proxied by equipment depreciation  /  Pcu_eqp )
I_RD_83  Investment in roadway (constant 1983 dollars) (Investment in road / P_MS)
I_EQ_83  Investment in equipment (constant 1983 dollars) (Investment in equipment / Pcu_eqpt)
GTMC  Gross ton miles of cars contents and cabooses for firm f at time t (in millions)
CM:  Car miles for firm f at time t  
TM:  Train miles for firm f at time t
THP  Thousands of horsepower miles ( locomotive unit miles * average horsepower)
THS  Total switching hours (road switching + yard switching)
MR:  The miles of rail operated by firm Af@ at time At@ 
TR  The miles of track operated by firm Af@ at time At@
P_F:  Price index for fuel (applicable only to the transportation sector )
P_WS:  Price index for wages and supplement.
P_MS:  Price index for materials and supplies.
P_O:  Price index for other operating expenses.
Pcu_eqpt  Producer price index for railroad equipment
d(firm #):  Firm dummy variable to compensate for inter-firm variation of non-merger firms
D_rr_#  Separate dummy variables representing firms where mergers have occurred   Each firm is 
indicated by a pre-merger number and a post merger number.  Mergers are assumed to have 
occurred when the reporting entities are changed.
D_rr_yr  Dummy variable to account for the first year of a newly merged firm   This allows for 
restatements of capital stock values as a result of the merger.
GTM_CM Gross ton miles per car mile (GTMC / CM)
GTM_TM Gross ton miles per train mile (GTMC / TM)
A_RD_83  Constant dollar value of roadway assets  (roadway assets / P_MS)
A_EQ_83  Constant dollar value of equipment assets  (equipment assets / Pcu_eqp)
A_RD_83_L Lagged value of constant dollar roadway assets
A_EQ_83_L Lagged value of constant dollar equipment assets
I_RD_83_L Lagged value of constant dollar roadway investment 
I_EQ_83_L Lagged value of constant dollar equipment investment 
GTMC_l  lagged value of gross ton miles
n_op_inc  Reported railroad net operating income
n_op_Inc_L Lagged value of railroad net operating income 
Prime  Prime interest rate 
Oth_cars  The number of non-Class 1 railroad owned cars
Shpr_car  The number of railroad cars owned by shippers
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Estimation was accomplished using the single equation two-stage least squares procedure in 
the Soritec econometric software package on a PC using Windows-2000.  Two-stage least squares 
was applied as an appropriate method for obtaining consistent estimates for an errors-in-variables 
model through the use of instrumental variables as suggested by Fomby, Hill and Johnson (1984, 
pp.478-482).  This methodology is appropriate for both the degradation and investment equations. 
Degradation, as stated earlier, is not directly measurable and must be estimated and related to 
operations.  Investment is more questionable, as a dollar value is reported in the railroad accounting 
records.  However, the process of deflating to constant dollar values brings a degree of variation into 
the investment levels as well so that it is appropriate to use the error-in-variables method for this 
series as well.  The regression results are listed in Tables 2a-d.
REGRESSION RESULTS  
Each of the equations for degradation and investment was estimated using the two stage least squares 
method.  Instruments included the size parameters miles of road (MR) and miles of track (TR), and 
the operating parameters gross ton miles (GTMC), car miles (CM), train miles(TM), thousands of 
horsepower-miles (THP), and thousands of switching hours (THS).  Also included was the prime 
interest rate as a measure of the cost of capital, the price indices for fuel, materials and supplies, 
wages and supplements, and other railroad goods.  Several additional “manufactured variables” 
were also included.  These were gross ton miles per car mile (GTM_CM), gross ton miles per train 
mile (GTM-TM), and lagged gross ton miles (GTMC_L).  The number of shipper (shpr_car) and 
non-Class I owned cars (oth_cars) were included as instruments as were current and lagged values 
of net operating income (n_op_inc and n_op_inc_l).  Lagged values of price adjusted roadway and 
equipment assets (as proxies for previous capital) were also included as well as dummy variables for 
each of the railroads both before and following any mergers and also for the year immediately after 
the merger to reflect accounting changes and consolidations..  
Results of stage II of the regressions are shown in Tables 2a-d.  For each of the degradation 
equations, the initial variables used in the second stage regression included the road and track 
miles, the five operating statistic measures, the lagged value of either price adjusted roadway or 
equipment assets, the variables GTM_TM and GTM_CM., and the variables oth_cars and shpr_
car.   For the investment equations, additional variables representing the four railroad price indices, 
the number of non-Class-I owned cars and shipper-owned cars, and current year and lagged net-
operating income were also included as was lagged gross ton miles and lagged constant dollar 
investment.  One problem with the use of railroad size and operating parameters jointly in estimation 
of degradation and investment is that a great deal of multicollinearity exists between the variables. 
While multicollinearity is less of a problem for forecasting equations, it often yields large standard 
errors (and small t statistics) which cause the analyst to reject coefficient estimates. For this reason, 
following the initial regression estimate, the equations were each parsed by deleting and adding 
back variables until each equation consisted of only variables that made economic sense and which 
were statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better.
Roadway Degradation
Roadway degradation involves wearing out of the right of way.  The dependent variable here was 
d_rd_83. The expectation was that the signs should be positive for the size, operating parameters 
and lagged real asset levels, and generally negative for the number-of-car variables. 
Following the parsing process, the equation for roadway degradation (Table 2a) uses three 
variables, all of which carry the expected positive signs.  These are miles of road, gross ton miles, 
and the lagged value of real roadway assets (A_RD_83_L).  As expected, the equation indicates 
that degradation will increase if the railroad has a larger track structure.  If gross ton miles should 
increase, wear on the track structure should also increase.  Finally, a greater level of real roadway 
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assets (a proxy for capital) would tend to lead to a higher level of degradation (weather and time 
as well as usage) as is expected. Fit of the equation is good with an adjusted R2 of 0.86 and a DW 
statistic of 2.07.
Equipment Degradation
Like roadway degradation, equipment degradation is expected to be positively related to the 
operating parameters, GTMC, CM, TM, THP, and THS.  The relationship to miles-of-road and 
Table 2: Regression Results Two-Stage Least Squares
a. Dependent Variable:  D_rd_83
Variable Coefficient Std Err  T-stat        Significance
  
CONST                  -1903.80        4384.24         -.434238       .664
MR                       3.25027        .843092          3.85517        .000
GTMC                     .147630E-03 .377838E-04    3.90722        .000
A_RD_83_L                .113298E-01    .206156E-02     5.49576        .000
    
Equation Summary
No. of Observations  =     267         R2 =   .8663   (adj)=   .8648
Sum of Sq. Resid. =   .505099E+12     Std. Error of Reg.=  43823.8
Log(likelihood)    =  -3230.52         Durbin-Watson     =  2.07152
Schwarz Criterion  =  -3241.69         F (  3,  263)    =   567.961
Akaike Criterion   =  -3234.52    Significance     =   .000000
          
   
b. Dependent Variable: D_EQ_83
  
Variable  Coefficient  Std Err     T-stat      Significance
  
CONST    -4895.57         5244.8        -.321131        .748
MR                       -3.31296         1.09347        -3.02976        .003
TR                        1.72666         .631069         2.73608        .007
GTMC                    -.139352E-03     .581495E-04    -2.39644       .017
TM                        .124520E-02     .411629E-03     3.02506        .003
THS                      .179520E-01     .508226E-02     3.53229        .000
A_EQ_83_L                .239878E-01     .267445E-02     8.96923        .000
SHPR_CAR                -.956163E-01     .203804E-01    -4.69159        .000
GTM_CM                   721.844         191.539         3.76865        .000
  
Equation Summary
No. of Observations =     267         R2 =   .8918   (adj)=   .8885
Sum of Sq. Resid. =   .151266E+12    Std. Error of Reg.=  24213.7
Log(likelihood)   =  -3069.56        Durbin-Watson     =  1.81361
Schwarz Criterion =  -3094.70         F (  8,  258)    =   265.922
Akaike Criterion  =  -3078.56         Significance     =   .000000
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track miles is more problematic however.  Depending on how trains are run and the types of trains, 
a bigger railroad may cause more or less wear on the equipment.  It is expected also that for both 
gross-ton-miles per car-mile and per train-mile the relationship should be positive.  The relationship 
to non-Class I cars should however be negative. 
After parsing the regression model, eight variables (Table 2b) were found to have statistical 
significance.  As miles-of-road increases, there is less wear on equipment, all else being held constant. 
However as track-miles increase (double trackage) speeds also tend to increase and this allows the 
equipment to wear out faster.  As GTMC increases the equation indicates that the equipment would 
wear out slower.  At first this seems counter intuitive, however, this should relate to both the type of 
c. Dependent Variable:   I_RD_83     
  
 Variable Coefficient  Std Err      T-stat         Significance
 
CONST   57622.3  29250.0         1.96999 .005
CM                   .175356E-01    .418481E-02     4.19029     .000
I_RD_83_L      .771935        .533591E-01    14.4668      .000
N_OP_INC          .704320E-01    .218780E-01   3.21930      .001 
   
N_OP_INC_L              -.580408E-01   .220752E-01  -2.62923     .009
OTH_CARS                -.645415        .353463        -1.82598     .069
SHPR_CAR                 .671552 .391572   1.71501      .088
   
Equation Summary
No. of Observations  =     267        R2 =   .9427   (adj)=   .9414  
Sum of Sq. Resid. =   .915058E+12    Std. Error of Reg.=  59325.0
Log(likelihood)    =  -3309.85        Durbin-Watson     =  2.44887
Schwarz Criterion  =  -3329.41        F (  6,  260)    =   713.203
Akaike Criterion   =  -3316.85        Significance     =   .000000
  
d. Dependent Variable: I_EQ_83
 Variable Coefficient  Std Err      T-stat         Significance
CONST  30237.0 12155.1  2.48760  .013
TM                      .281691E-02   .705368E-03    3.99353   .000
GTMC_L              -.441859E-03 .122698E-03   -3.60118  .000
P_F                     -141.548        59.3870        -2.38348  .018
I_EQ_83_L              .673764        .756373E-01     8.90784  .000
N_OP_INC_L         .362118E-01   .213422E-01    1.69672  .091
Equation Summary
No. of Observations =     267        R2 =   .6943   (adj)=   .6884
Sum of Sq. Resid. =   .903119E+12    Std. Error of Reg.=  58823.7
Log(likelihood)   =  -3308.10       Durbin-Watson     =  2.26213
Schwarz Criterion =  -3324.86        F (  5,  261)    =   118.557
Akaike Criterion  =  -3314.10        Significance     =   .000000
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traffic and speeds.  If the traffic is heavy-loading traffic carried in non-Class I cars, the degradation 
of railroad-owned equipment should decrease.  This is confirmed by the negative coefficient on the 
shipper-car variable as well.  As would be expected, equipment degradation increases with each of 
the following, train miles, switching hours, gross-ton-miles per car-mile (heavy wheel loading) and 
the lagged value of deflated equipment assets. The equation explains more than 88% of the variation 
with no noted problem of autocorrelation (DW = 1.81).
Roadway Investment
The expected relationships for roadway investment are a bit more complex than for degradation. 
Generally, the greater the number of miles of road and track, greater investment would be expected. 
Also, with greater traffic, investment would be expected to increase.  Increases in investment should 
also come from an increased ability to spend the necessary money (operating income).  Input prices 
are generally expected to be negatively related to investment. Ownership of cars may have either a 
positive or negative effect depending on the type of car and the type of traffic.  
As shown in Table 2c, the parsed equation for real equipment investment is explained by six 
factors and yields an adjusted R2 of 0.94 with a DW statistic of 2.45.  As car-miles increase, the 
equation predicts that there will be more investment in roadway as is expected. The lagged value of 
investment in roadway also carries a positive sign consistent with the fact that in many cases large-
scale roadway projects are a multi-year undertaking.  Net operating income has a positive effect in 
the current year but a negative effect when lagged one period.  This relates to the availability of funds. 
If income is down in a given year, some cutbacks will be made to roadway investment (deferred 
maintenance).  However this may be made up in the following year if profitability increases.  The 
variables for other-cars and shipper-cars likewise have opposite signs.  Much of the increase in 
shipper owned cars over the last two decades has been in heavy duty cars such as utility owned coal 
cars.  These cars are newer and generally in better condition, but also involve heavy wheel loading 
which leads to the need for a better track structure. Cars owned by non-Class I railroads have 
remained relatively stable in number and tend to be older but because they often have lower wheel 
loadings they do not cause as much wear on the track structure.
Equipment Investment 
Equipment investment is not generally expected to be related to the number of miles-of-road or of 
track.  However, it is normally expected to relate positively to operating parameters, negatively to 
input prices, and positively to previous investment and income.  
As shown in (Table 2d) the regression results generally follow the expected pattern (although 
the regression statistics are the least robust of the four models).  As train-miles increase, equipment 
investment is expected to increase.  As prices increase, investment is expected to decrease as the 
available dollars go to pay for the factors of production.  This is especially true for fuel prices which 
are far more volatile than the other price indices.  As fuel becomes more expensive in any given 
year, the pool of funds available to pay for additional equipment is reduced.  As would be expected, 
there are positive coefficients on lagged equipment investment (multi-year programs) and lagged 
net operating income.  The one quirk here is the negative sign on lagged gross-ton-miles.  As traffic 
increases it is expected that equipment investment will also increase.  However, previous period 
traffic has a negative effect on equipment investment which is tempered by the positive relationship 
with lagged net operating income.  If earnings are up, the firm is expected to invest more in plant and 
equipment in the following period.  Of the four equations, the equation for investment in equipment 
explains the least of the variation with an adjusted R2 of 0.69.  Autocorrelation does not appear to be 
a problem however as the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.26.  
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
Having estimated the levels of investment in both roadway and equipment it remains to substitute 
the results into equation (1) to obtain estimates of the net change in roadway and equipment capital 
for each district and each year.  This is accomplished by summing the fitted values of the regression 
estimates for investment and degradation to obtain a value of the net change in capital stock by class 
for each period.  For each of the years in the sample period, the estimated values of degradation and 
investment taken from the regression results are evaluated at the regional level to get an estimate 
of capital stock on an eastern/western regional basis.  These values are then summed to develop 
estimates for the capital stocks in the United States as a whole. 
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 3 and 4 and Figures 1 and 2, which show the 
changes in the levels of railway capital (previous period level plus investment minus degradation) 
that occurred over the projected period of 1983 through 2005.  Roadway capital is seen to be 
expanding on a fairly consistent basis for the total period in both the east and west.  Equipment 
capital is relatively flat through the examined period, staying steady through the first 10 years, 
expanding through the next six and once again staying steady through the last six years. Some of 
the stability in railroad-owned equipment capital levels may be explained by the increase in shipper 
and other railroad-owned cars over the period following deregulation.  As mentioned above, many 
of these (particularly shipper-owned) cars were heavy load cars such as covered hoppers and coal 
cars that required the railroads to increase their motive power but also allowed for reductions in 
the relative stock of railroad-owned cars.  This demonstrates a factor in the growth of both types of 
capital as a change was occurring in the types of equipment and trackage used as firms tried to move 
toward a more competitive stance in the general transportation marketplace.  
Figures 3 and 4 show the relative changes in the levels of capital based on the number of miles-
of-roadway operated in each of the districts.  On this basis, both roadway and equipment capital are 
seen to be increasing not only over time but also relative to the size of the railroad.  This change 
in capital compared to size is consistent with the tendency to sell off or abandon lower density 
lines (reducing both miles-of-road and miles-of-track) as would be expected in the period following 
deregulation.  If one recalls that railroad capital, especially right-of-way capital tends to be long-
lived it makes sense that when placed in a position of competition, not only with other railroads but 
also the motor carrier industry, that the railroads would initially be concerned with maintaining and 
improving the level of the right-of-way (nothing moves rapidly or safely on bad track).
Figures 5 and 6 show the levels of roadway and equipment capital used by the railroads on a per 
gross-ton-mile basis.  In the east, there is a dramatic increase in roadway capital per gross ton mile 
in the early years of deregulation.  This then becomes fairly level for the remainder of the period. 
Much of this early improvement in eastern roadway capital may be a result of Conrail’s investments 
in right of way.  In the west, the trend was generally downward after an early jump in 1986, a year 
where several consolidations took place.  By 1997, the western railroads had essentially stabilized 
their roadway-per-gross-ton-mile ratio and maintained it through the end of the period.
Equipment capital per gross ton mile shows a decidedly different pattern.  In the east, the ratio 
is highly stable over the entire period.  In the west however, the trend is downward on a consistent 
basis.  Much of this is attributable to the shippers buying many of the heavy-duty (aluminum-coal 
and grain) cars that were put into service over this period.  The railroads had to provide motive 
power but not the cars.  The dramatic decrease in capital stock per unit of traffic demonstrates the 
move toward efficiency by the railroads.  This is especially true in the west as much of the increase 
in traffic involved heavier wheel-loading cars on primarily high-density trackage.  Additionally, the 
equipment numbers reflect the railroads’ adoption of the new technology of the articulated double-
stack car.  This process is expected to continue into the future at a slower rate while other outdated 
equipment is further depreciated or written off.  It is interesting to note that, especially in the west, 
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Table 3: Estimated Roadway Capital Stock
 Total
 EAST WEST U.S.
 Capital Capital Capital 
Year Invest Degrade Stock Invest Degrade Stock Stock
1983 17,130,406 19,812,932 36,943,338
1984 951,843 528,767 17,553,482 1,383,514 704,488 20,491,957 38,045,439
1985 957,029 517,760 17,992,750 1,754,522 701,374 21,545,105 39,537,855
1986 1,359,532 515,585 18,836,697 1,583,004 696,611 22,431,498 41,268,195
1987 1,274,051 510,488 19,600,259 1,404,826 699,872 23,136,452 42,736,711
1988 998,476 519,988 20,078,748 1,400,615 720,881 23,816,186 43,894,934
1989 1,257,319 507,710 20,828,357 1,262,966 721,719 24,357,433 45,185,791
1990 971,010 496,515 21,302,851 1,404,635 712,242 25,049,827 46,352,678
1991 927,696 493,725 21,736,822 1,227,022 704,008 25,572,842 47,309,664
1992 929,624 488,125 22,178,321 1,163,959 668,630 26,068,171 48,246,492
1993 936,924 490,392 22,624,853 1,198,481 649,704 26,616,948 49,241,801
1994 901,297 492,653 23,033,497 1,264,396 667,042 27,214,302 50,247,799
1995 856,533 490,471 23,399,559 1,300,587 703,472 27,811,417 51,210,976
1996 1,063,987 492,646 23,970,900 1,681,776 767,826 28,725,367 52,696,267
1997 970,375 499,310 24,441,965 1,686,409 786,322 29,625,454 54,067,419
1998 1,011,356 507,576 24,945,746 1,706,094 798,047 30,533,500 55,479,245
1999 1,230,052 521,812 25,653,985 1,935,341 829,757 31,639,084 57,293,069
2000 1,058,399 473,789 26,238,596 1,850,134 849,002 32,640,216 58,878,812
2001 1,246,558 474,750 27,010,404 1,764,080 877,089 33,527,207 60,537,611
2002 1,013,071 488,372 27,535,103 1,865,073 881,929 34,510,351 62,045,454
2003 985,012 540,902 27,979,213 2,024,680 916,243 35,618,788 63,598,000
2004 1,076,831 557,510 28,498,534 1,952,148 949,323 36,621,612 65,120,147




































Figure 1: Estimated Roadway Capital Stock
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Table 4: Estimated Equipment Capital Stock
 Total
 EAST WEST U.S.
 Capital Capital Capital 
Year Invest Degrade Stock Invest Degrade Stock Stock
1983 10,543,715 12,080,666 22,624,381
1984 267,784 494,392 10,317,107 406,391 498,750 11,988,307 22,305,414
1985 424,826 481,985 10,259,948 353,317 465,890 11,875,735 22,135,682
1986 490,174 463,273 10,286,848 435,163 453,929 11,856,969 22,143,817
1987 379,411 450,913 10,215,347 343,089 451,814 11,748,244 21,963,591
1988 315,042 458,228 10,072,162 414,080 475,954 11,686,371 21,758,532
1989 377,938 346,379 10,103,721 585,425 483,816 11,787,980 21,891,702
1990 484,021 408,726 10,179,017 510,585 454,622 11,843,943 22,022,960
1991 387,848 387,671 10,179,194 463,904 432,100 11,875,747 22,054,941
1992 424,900 367,408 10,236,686 412,156 447,256 11,840,647 22,077,333
1993 394,385 371,670 10,259,401 419,393 447,876 11,812,164 22,071,566
1994 600,759 397,461 10,462,700 568,152 466,584 11,913,733 22,376,433
1995 534,635 394,555 10,602,780 809,477 478,966 12,244,244 22,847,024
1996 696,617 387,822 10,911,575 801,321 442,883 12,602,682 23,514,257
1997 722,127 387,424 11,246,278 784,477 430,702 12,956,457 24,202,735
1998 541,064 406,361 11,380,982 876,885 436,400 13,396,942 24,777,923
1999 713,406 425,822 11,668,565 830,777 455,724 13,771,994 25,440,560
2000 792,152 279,072 12,181,646 656,570 320,576 14,107,989 26,289,634
2001 606,545 417,373 12,370,818 451,762 440,363 14,119,388 26,490,206
2002 438,647 407,543 12,401,922 383,900 433,166 14,070,123 26,472,045
2003 446,459 418,391 12,429,989 414,069 427,127 14,057,065 26,487,055
2004 399,794 430,569 12,399,215 585,981 464,736 14,178,310 26,577,525

































Figure 2: Estimated Equipment Capital Stock






















































Figure 4: Estimated Equipment Capital Stock per Mile of Road
railroads seemed to be achieving a much more efficient usage of their capital stocks relative to traffic 
levels.  This may be explained in part by both increased usage of higher-density lines and increased 
utilization of shipper-owned equipment.
CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The model presented here provides a method of obtaining reasonable estimates of railroad capital 
structure under some rather restrictive regression and data creation assumptions, indicating that 
following deregulation, the railroads tended to adjust the rate of capital accumulation in an attempt 
to become more economically efficient by concentrating more on roadway investment rather than 
on equipment.  
























































Figure 6: Estimated Equipment Capital Stock per Gross Ton-Mile
Several additional areas for further study in the area of railway capital structure are immediately 
suggested by the current research.  First, the data may allow adjustment so that the equipment 
classification may be further disaggregated into locomotive, freight car, and other equipment 
classifications.  This breakdown would allow for closer examination of exactly how the railroads 
were investing.  Second, this study has concentrated on roadway and equipment expenditures.  A 
third classification of capital expenditures on other items exists and inclusion of these items (such 
as office computers) may give valuable insights into relative changes in managerial as opposed to 
operational concentration.
Additionally, the analysis could be extended to a more interrelated simultaneous equation 
methodology along with estimates of railroad costs such as in Friedlaender (1993) rather than the 
two-stage least squares (instrumental variable) method used here.  This would allow for possible 
interactions between the error terms of the capital stock degradation and investment estimates with 
the other cost factors in the various sectors of rail operation as well.  It is expected that such research 
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will yield significant advances in the area of analysis of the rail transportation production and costing 
problem.
Finally, the estimates of capital stocks can be used in the development of models of rail cost. 
These estimates, for example, show that capital has been, in fact, increasing over the last two decades 
at the same time that miles of road has been decreasing.  Use of the capital stock values can therefore 
greatly reduce the biases introduced into costing models by the use of a single-size variable such as 
miles of road or number of cars.
Endnotes
1. A more general derivation of the perpetual inventory method of estimating capital stocks can be 
found in “Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States 1925-94,” U.S. Department 
of Commerce; August 1999.
2. There is always some question in a model such as this as to whether the investment values for 
each year should be taken directly from the accounting data or estimated.  Two arguments can 
be made for using estimated values.  First, the deflators to put the estimates into real terms are 
not completely accurate as investment involves the purchase of many different items which 
may not be covered by the price index as accurately as desired.  Second, some investment 
programs that are put in place involve more than one year’s expenditures so that the smoothing 
that is accomplished by estimating investment and then using a projected value may in fact 
more accurately represent the real pattern of investment over time.  
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